Three logics that shape the foreign policy strategy and behavior of the various governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the face of the security dilemma posed by the United States: Fatalist logic, Mitigator logic, and Transcender logic:

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, International Relations Department, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Faculty of Humanities, Yasuj University, Yasuj, Iran

Abstract

"Security Dilemma" is considered a central concept among all neorealist theories. How a country interprets the "security dilemma" resulting from the actions of another country (ies) and what strategy and behavior it adopts based on that interpretation. Government decision-makers and policymakers interpret the security dilemma through three a priori logics (the Fatalist logic, the Mitigator logic, and the Transcender logic). By framing the concept of "security dilemma", this study seeks to answer the main question that the "strategies and behaviors of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in various governments towards the "security dilemma" due to the military presence of the United States in the regions around Iran, How are they formed?"It hypothesizes that "the various governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran, by choosing one of three Fatalist, Mitigator and Transcender logics to interpret the 'security dilemma' resulting from the presence of the United States in the regions around Iran. Iran has chosen a specific type of foreign policy strategy and behavior:1)by Fatalist logic, maximizing the consolidation of components of power (including military power) and not giving up the missile program in exchange for some incentives. Has been pursued, because otherwise the survival of the system is threatened (such as the issue of Libya); 2)by Mitigator logic, policies such as de-escalation and the signing of agreements such as the JCPOA have been unsuccessful due to US cheating and concerns about relative gains

Keywords


  • لف- منابع فارسی

    • آجیلی، هادی و رضایی، نیما (1397)، رئالیسم تدافعی و تهاجمی: چارچوبی تئوریک برای تحلیل وقایع و رخدادهای حوزه خلیج­فارس، امنیت ملی، سال هشتم، شماره 27.
    • دهقانی فیروزآبادی، سیدجلال (1395)، اصول و مبانی روابط بین­الملل، جلد دوم، تهران: سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاه­ها (سمت)، مرکز تحقیق و توسعه علوم انسانی.
    • رضایی، نیما و پرتو، فتح­اله (1396)، جنگ اطلاعاتی ایالات متحده علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران: ماهیت، کارکردها و ابزارهای مقابله، تهران: نشر دا.
    • رمضانی تکلیمی، داود (1387)، ساختار نظامی آمریکا، تهران: مرکز آموزشی و پژوهشی شهید سپهبد صیاد شیرازی.
    • سیک، گری (1384)، گزینه‌های نظامی و محدودیت‌های آن، در وارن کریستوفر و دیگران، تجربه یک بحران: ریشه های سیاسی، حقوقی و مالی بیانیه­های الجزایر، ترجمه نصرت ا... حلمی، تهران: میزان.
    • طبری‌زاده، رمضان و مرئی، سیدمجتبی (1388)، آموزه‌های جنگ خلیج فارس(2003-1991)، تهران: دانشکده فرماندهی و ستاد آجا، انتشارات دافوس.
    • مصلحی، حیدر و رضایی، نیما (1399)، درآمدی بر نظریه­ها، مکاتب و رویکردها در باب «امنیت»: اسلام و غرب، تهران: نشر دا.
    • مشیرزاده، حمیرا (1384)، تحول نظریه­های روابط بین­الملل، تهران: سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاه­ها (سمت)، مرکز تحقیق و توسعه علوم انسانی.
    • وب­گاه مقام معظم رهبری (بهمن 19، 1398)، بیانات در دیدار فرماندهان و کارکنان نیروی هوایی ارتش، قابل دسترسی در: https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=44852
    • وب­گاه مقام معظم رهبری (دی 18، 1398)، بیانات رهبرانقلاب درباره سردار شهید سپهبد حاج قاسم سلیمانی: قهرمان پرافتخار، قابل دسترسی در: https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=49244

     

    ب- منابع لاتین

    • Air-Sea Battle Office (2013), Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration To Address Anti-access & Area Denial Challenges, available at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf
    • Alcazar, V. (2012), “Crisis Management and the Anti-Access/Area Denial Problem”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, Issue. 4.
    • Booth, K., & Wheeler, N. J. (2008), The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust In World Politics, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Booth, K., & Wheeler, N. J. (2013), “Uncertainty”, In Paul D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, London & New York, Routledge.
    • Collins, A. (2000), The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Department of Defence (2012), JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC), available at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/ JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf
    • Donnelly, J. (2013), “Realism”, In Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations, Third Edition, Hampshire & New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Global Security (2013), Operation Enduring Freedom, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom -ops.htm
    • Grieco, J. M. (1988), “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3.
    • Herz, J. H. (1950), “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2.
    • International Security Assistance Force (2013), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, available at http://www.rs.nato.int/ images/stories/File/ Placemats/20130624_130624-mb-isaf-placemat.pdf
    • Jervis, R. (2001), “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1.
    • Jervis, R. (1978), “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 30, Issue 2.
    • Keohane, R. O. (1993), “The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European- American Research Programme”, In Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford. Clarendon Press.
    • Krasner, S. D. (1983), “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, In S. D. Krasner, International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
    • Kratochwil, F. V., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986), “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State”, International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 4.
    • Lobell, S. E. (2010), “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism”, In Robert A. Denemark, The International Studies Encyclopedia Volume X, London, Willey-Blackwell.
    • Office of Director of National Intelligence (2009), National Intelligence Strategy of the United States 2009, available at http://www.dni. gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports% 20and%20Pubs/2009_NIS.pdf
    • Osherenko, G., & Young, O. R. (1993), “The Formation of International Regimes: Hypotheses and Cases”, In O. R. Young & G. Osherenko, Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press.
    • Snyder, G. H. (2002), “Mearsheimer’s World— Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security”, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1.
    • Taliaferro, J. W. (2000/01), “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3.
    • The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2022), The Military Balance 2022: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, London, Routledge.
    • S. Goverment Publishing Office (2002), Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, available at http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ PPP-2002-book1/pdf/ PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg129-3.pdf
    • United States Central Command (CENTCOM) (n.d. a), U.S. Central Command History, available at http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/history-en
    • United States Central Command (CENTCOM) (n.d. b), About U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), available at http://www.centcom. mil/en/about-centcom-en
    • Wheeler, N. J., & Booth, K. (1992), “The Security Dilemma”, In John Baylis & N. J. Rengger, Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
    • Young, O. R. (1986), “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions”, World Politics, Vol. 39, Issue 01.